Category Archives: Bible

Discussion of historical and textual issues related to the Hebrew and Greek bibles, and their commentators

Paper topics

In class I spoke briefly about the following topics for the 2d paper on Luke:

  1. An analysis of the way the author presents women from chapter 1 to where we are (chapter 8-9). This entails reflecting upon three areas: the biblical background (as we saw in the author’s presentation of Elizabeth and Mary), the social expectations of the time regarding women, whether from the Greco-Roman or Hellenistic background or the Palestinian side, and finally the practices of the early Christian communities that the author is familiar with and is addressing or reflecting (to change them or support them).
  2. A literary and sociological commentary on one of the healing stories we have seen so far. One may look at the structure of the story proper, its location and role in the larger Lukan framework, the possible imitation of either biblical or Hellenistic models of healing stories, and the author’s use of the story.
  3. Thirdly, a literary and philosophical reflexion on the nature of language, and especially parabolic language, through the study of the parable of the sower in Luke 8.4-15. Isn’t all language parabolic?

Green will be very helpful for the three topics. But the most important source is the Lukan text itself, and your reflections on it.
Please let me know if you have questions (comment button below).

Parable of the sower

The gospel parables appear to be the mark of a new genre of literature in the Aramaic- and Greek-speaking Near East. It’s not entirely true, see more on this below.

They bring four aspects of life to the hearer’s attention: One, the hidden nature of life, especially in its most commonly accepted aspects. Secondly, its irrevocable dynamism and its urgency (the parables are almost all about urgency: this has often been seen as part of the apocalyptic slant of Jesus and the gospels, but it is wider than this). Thirdly, the event encapsulated in a parable, however small, leads to a definition or re-definition of human relations and justice. Finally, all parables raise the possibility of radical change and reparation.

But first, what constitutes a parable? Is it identifiable by its shape? It would have a distinctive opener, for instance, or a chiastic structure, without firm conclusion, and would be in need of explanation? How would it be different from a simile or an allegory? Does one think immediately of a didactic point, a moral point? But what do we mean by “moral?” A lesson obvious to all, easy to point to and to remember and transmit to others? But then, why speak in parables?

Secondly, is it “self-determined” text, or is it intended? that is, an authorial voice or intention underlies the text.

A short history of the genre

Fables have along history:

  • for instance contest fables in Sumerian and Akkadian, as in the the debate between the Date Palm and the Tamarisk: (unknown no. of lines missing)

    Lines 1-10 The Tamarisk opened his mouth and spoke. He addressed the Date Palm: “My body …. the bodies of the gods. (The reference is to statues of tamarisk wood.) You grow your fruits but someone places them before me like a maid approaching her mistress. You do not provide the measuring vessels. You are …. minor crops, but I …. Your attendants …. before me for you.”
    Lines 11–19 In his anger the Date Palm answered him. He addressed his brother the Tamarisk: “You say: ‘If people build daises for me and beautify them too, they certainly do not swear by the gods before clay (?).’ — You may be the body of the gods in their shrines and people may name with a good name the daises of the gods, but it is silver that can pride itself as the overlay of the gods. …., describe your beauty!”

  • There are fables in Hebrew Bible: Judges 9.8-15 (Yotham); 2 Kings 14.9-10.
  • Parables using humans: there is a small number in the Hebrew Bible, which could all be seen as blame stories (blame mashals), used as legal stratagems:
    • Prophet Nathan and David, 2 Sam 12.1-14
    • the woman of Tekoah, 2 Sam 14.1-20
    • 1 Kgs 20.35-43
    • Isaiah 5.1-7 (see 27.2-6), the song of the vineyard (involving humans and plants): see below.
  • The fact that there are a few parables in the Hebrew Bible as well as in post-biblical Jewish literature means that the form was not borrowed from Hellenistic literature in Palestinian literature. Neither did Jesus invent the form, which would have been borrowed later by the rabbis. Indeed, D. Stern suggests that the small number of texts in this form in the Hebrew Bible and in early post-biblical Jewish literature might be due to “the social status of the literary form” (see D. Stern, Parables in Midrash, p. 187.). It was perhaps despised by a sophisticated scribal tradition writing for narrow audience. In fact, the popularity of the parable or mashal and the social status of its practitioners: popular preachers, may have led to its being discounted by scribes, though one would expect to see traces of this putative contempt or rift.
    The parables attributed to Jesus, then, would be the first extensive, abundant, and socially significant, evidence of a phenomenon that would be quite accepted as a literary form later in Talmudic literature, especially in the Midrashim.

Gospel parables

A list (among many possible lists. Note that it is possible to construct a
list on the basis of formal characteristics. See Via et al, as well as Propp):

1. the Sower: Mk 4.38, 13–20 // Mt 13.3–8a
2. the unforgiving slave: Mt 18.23–35
3. the workers in the vineyard: Mt 20.1–16
4. the lost sheep; lost coin; lost son (Mt / Lk)
5. the good Samaritan: Lk 10.25–37
6. the rich fool: Lk 12.16–21 and Thomas 63
7. the rich man and Lazarus: Lk 16.19–31
8. “parables of wisdom”
9. the unjust manager: Lk 16.1–8
10. faithful servant: Mt 24.45–51
11. the ten maidens: Mt 25.1–13;
12. cf. waiting slaves, Mk 13..34–37 and Lk 1.35–38
13. the two sons (Mt 21.28–32)
14. the friend at midnight (Lk 11.5–8)
15. the unjust judge (Lk 18.2–8)
16. the father’s good gifts (Mt 7.9–11 // Lk 11.11–13)
17. the barren fig–tree (Lk 13.69); other stories of fig-trees;
18. the slave at duty (Lk 17.7–10)
19. the talents (Mt 25.14–30);
20. the pounds (Lk 19.12–27)
21. the weeds in the wheat (Mt 13.24–30, 36–43, Thomas 57);
22. the dragnet (Mt 13.47–50)
23. final judgment (Mt 25.31–46)
24. the great banquet (Lk 14.16–24);
25. the wedding feast (Mt 22.1–14)
26. the wicked tenants (Mk 12.1–12; Mt 21.33–46 // Lk 20.9–19; Thomas 65–66)
27. Parables of the kingdom: growth
28. joy of finding…

The sower, Luke 8.4–8

Why does Jesus speak in parables? To be deliberately confusing? Ex. of Mk 4.1–9 // Mt 13.1–9 // Lk 8.4–8. We move backwards in a “night of time” towards a beginning, to moments of illumination lived at the dawn of language, to a well of being. The nature of life is hidden and tamed from the earliest moment by well-learned images and phrases. Parables are first of all a revelation of life as an gift made with some urgency and that claimed our attention and our response. The image of the sower is at the beginning of parables. I take this to be a serious invitation to consider these initial words in the light of our own lived “dawn of language” as we remember it.

Structure: Jesus is teaching by the sea of Galilee. Note the basic elements: sea, seed, soil, and rock. A great crowd gathers. Luke has no sea of Galilee, no climbing on a boat. The structure of the story in Luke goes something like this:

> The sower went out to sow. It happened that the seed fell:
(1) on (by) the path.
was trampled
birds ate it
(2) on the rock
grows
dries up
(3) in the middle of thorns
grows together
asphyxiated
(4) in good soil
grew
made fruit (x 100)

Still 3 negative soils and a positive one, but with pairs of verbs for each stage.

The interpreter’s goal is to transcend the historical, philological, and theological approaches and take seriously the recent developments in the study of language (Saussure? Jakobson? Austin?). See A.N. Wilder, “Telling from depth to depth: the parable of the sower,” ch. 3 of his Jesus’ Parables (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), pp. 89–100.

First of all: How does it echo, what response does it evoke in us (?), in “the original listener,”or ‘reader,” since it becomes text early on and was framed within a particular frame of reference (though this frame would not be necessarily precise, since it is the function of language, esp. poetic language, to construct the frame of reference while giving new power to language).

The parable, according to Wilder, addresses two “deep sounding boards:” first, the relationship of human beings to the earth, but a mediated one, involving tilling, planting, the mystery of “tricking” nature, and its willingness to respond. Two, the effort of human beings to go out of themselves, to take a risk and yet trust there will be a response. How deeply?

At this imaginary level, it would be detrimental to allegorize. There is no need to think of the sower as being the divinity (God: what does this mean?), the “King.” The sower going out and meeting with four types of soil (one being not a soil exactly, the other a pretend-soil, the third a soil with the requisite depth). The parable tells about something deeply felt but differently expressed. The anguish of risking all (sowing is risk-taking; agriculture everywhere, and especially in dry-farming zones, is about trying to reduce risk, by using different crops, staggering, changing plots or exchanging them, etc., and distributing the yield widely), the risking failure is an effort, a conatus, as Wilder says.

It is noteworthy that in the use of the “sowing grain” metaphor, no weeding or hoeing can happen once the field has been sown. The essential work is done, it is hoped that the rains will come in time, and diseases and pests won’t attack the crop.
One just has to wait for the results (a long season). The crop is seen as bounty, miracle, grace. It is perhaps because there has been that period of waiting and worrying, without direct care and in the impossibility of changing the fateful sowing and field?

The mystery of this story is the absence of a middle point, an average yield. The reality of farming was of low averages, precisely because of birds, disease, lack of soil, weed competition. Yet Jesus and successors tap into a basic ground here: the hope, which drives the peasant (anyone) to see plenitude when things work “right,” and celebrate it. Perhaps this is less true of our times of plenty, when we have become experts at seeing rarity everywhere, beginning with our economics textbooks, because enough of us (with power) are in a world of plenty.

The extraordinarily fruitful response (to history? can one conflate the individual and the society at this point, because surely all ancient thinking was organically centered around the group’s needs) takes time. Sowing itself must be done at a certain time in the year, and there is an urgency to it as there is to harvesting and all other possibilities. Growth itself, up to fruitfulness, is long delayed, a theme often taken up in other parables of growth and frustration (see e.g. the story of the fig-tree). In this parable too, the fruitfulness is not only a matter of depth of soil or hearing, it is a matter of patience.

The bird doesn’t sow or “harvest” but just picks as it goes from the path. Agriculture, and so risk and worry, are absent. More on the path: it is trampled, and would be set away from the good soil. There is no process at this point, but also little seed having this fate.

The rocky part of the field—rock ledges on terraced fields all through Palestine—is the area with a little soil, so there is the beginning of germination (and a hope on the part of this uncalculating sower), it takes some time for the grain to germinate, grow, and die. In this respect, one has here more of a loss than before with the birds, because there was some hope of a yield, and it is likely to be a more common situation.

The third type of soil is deep but “thorns” (of several kinds in Palestine, and quite common, as all of agriculture is a struggle with weeds) grow also and take advantage of the richness of the cultivated soil. The thorns and weeds grow together with the good grain and cannot be removed easily. It takes time, right up to the harvest, to realize one gets only “thorns” rather than grain or fruit.

The fourth kind of soil is just right, like the brick house in the story of the three little pigs or the food in the story of the three little bears. The farmer or sower has done his best to ensure its receptivity to the seed. When it gives fruit, it will be in time, and the labor, worry, and long wait will be forgotten while hope will be transformed into joy. An exaggerated joy? Or just the feeling that the abundance of nature is to be celebrated. The sower’s work and inherent risk-taking are forgotten, or rather take their proper place as a service of preparation. The harvest is a miracle. In the seed proper, there is the miracle of something dry that will “fall” and “die” to become another plant that feeds many.

The preceding remarks are based on paying close attention to the concrete situation of the sower: the time factor, the risk and hope versus the plenitude of the harvest, the lack of “average” or middle way when it comes to fruiting.

Allegorizations are possible. Narrowly conceived, i.e. term to term, it is possible to equate the sower with the divinity, the seed with the “word” or Torah, the first soil or path as those too brutish to understand, and the birds as Satan, the second soil as the enthusiasts, the third soil as the worriers and busy bodies, etc., as the gospel does already. Another possibility is to allegorize as previously done the notions of sower, seed, soil, but adding the implicit ideas of risk, time, plenitude, and lack of a middle position or average. The allegory in this case is more open and deals with more dynamic quantities. The parable could be widened to a view of history—assumed by a culture steeped into the Torah, its Exodus story, especially the Deuteronomy and the Prophets—in which the seed or ferment is the word indeed, that is to say, the revelation that has been kept, treasured, sifted and refined (filtered), repeated, and then cast, repeatedly throughout history, and orientates or vectorizes everything. One can’t but respond. The more urgent responses are not necessarily the more fruitful.

[I have to translate this] Toujours à propos du semeur et en continuant à allégoriser: la métaphore de la semence exprime l’idée que la parole constitue l’audience dans l’acte de l’écoute. Là où il n’y a que passage, préoccupations, soucis de mille ordres, il peut aussi y avoir attention, écoute qui peut devenir profonde et donner naissance à une grande générosité. Mais il n’y a pas de milieu. La semence ou se perd ou fructifie. Une fois “mise en terre,” elle ne peut être “capitalisée” ou “mise en réserve.” Ceci est proposé comme métaphore pour toute parole ou tout geste humain, pour la Torah, inspirée de Dieu.

The sower goes out to sow grain. The preparation of the seed and even of the soil is bracketed out, or assumed. Worrying about having enough and a seed of good quality, plowing and composting, weeding, hoeing, for a hoped for harvest, for an eventual return, full and joyous. Home, the room at home is the goal of the voyage. Sowing is an emptying, a casting out of something precious that has been saved (perhaps in spite of hunger), it is a risk, a fateful gesture. On the horizon, there may be the Yizreel of Scripture, not the plain itself, but the stories in which God is the sower of life.

The word for sower is masculine in Aramaic and Greek (a male activity), whereas the earth or soil is feminine. But it is a complex soil, whose complexity is beyond gender, comprising a path, rocks, weeds. The grain falls, though note that grain is never mentioned: Anything can happen. It is the virtue or miracle of grain that, given a little soil and humidity, it will grow, no matter what.

Forgiveness and Lk 6.27–38

Shouldn’t we agree with Nietzsche who thought forgiveness doesn’t break the cycle of revenge but rather perpetuates it (quotation?). Nietzsche’s ethics of heroic, generous, managnimous gift-giving would be better. Though this gift-giving looks like another version of ancient philanthropy (or the modern version, with its trickle down counterpart)? For Nietzsche, forgiving is a tool of the weak to have their turn at the levers of power and perpetuate their weakness (they are non-heroes). A contemptible, weasely trick. The weak are not in a position to forgive actually, are they? Doesn’t one need to be in power in order to forgive? All of these are questions I’d like to discuss tomorrow.

Below are a few notes I took when thinking about the way forgiveness works, at least in interpersonal relationships. A very good book on the topic is Vladimir Jankélévitch’s forgiveness (Chicago, 2005).

What forgiveness is not: the hope that the trickling of time, drop by drop, will wear out or efface the fault or offense, as if it were sand and not very consistent. Would that forgetfulness would erode the fault with the memory of it! People will be quick to say, “Time heals” or, “after all, this is how history works…” Id est, violence, injustice, etc., lose their capacity to hurt and be recognized as something that may happen to oneself and become part of the machinery or unfolding of history. Perhaps, as in a misunderstood concept developed by Adam Smith, history too, or the somnolence of time, like the global market, would correct things magically, with the wave of an invisible hand. No anamnesis here, or painful effort to recognize something or someone and at least mark a possible ground for forgiveness. No, rather forgetfulness and a naturalizing of history, that is, the suffering of others, long buried, or to whom one may be indifferent (not recognized).

What forgiveness is not either, to continue with Jankélévitch: an effort to understand all the dimensions and causality of an act, however wicked or offensive, because “tout comprendre c’est tout pardonner” (to understand is to forgive everything). It was a question of knowledge or lack thereof, after all, or simple ignorance. Proper knowledge would have set things right.

Finally, it is not a resetting of accounts either, or an attempt to set the counter back to zero, in a seemingly magnanimous gesture of “letting go”. So for instance the powerful forces behind the ethics/market/psychologizing ways of smoothing personal difficulties in proclaiming a “move on” attitude. No consignment to silence of this kind.

What is forgiveness then? the opposite of this weak hope of “wearing things out”. A confrontation done with some urgency, and a painful remembering, with another person (a person one can hurt, that is essential—see below), not an image or reconstruction of it. It cannot excuse on “rational” grounds. It is irrational to forgive, or must feel so. The gratuity or grace of the act, surely this is a waste, when rationality is about balance, measure, reciprocity, calculations of one’s due. One’s due: no forgiveness without a strong sense of justice, and even without the capacity to inflict punishment, at least on the horizon. No forgiveness if one cannot hurt the other party. On the other side of forgiveness, the recognition that the transformed landscape is as it should be, a new rationality.

Luke 6 for Wednesday

For this Wednesday, Luke 6.12–49 and Green 257–81. Volunteers for giving a few comments on the following pages?

  • Lk 6.12–16 and Green 257–60;
  • Lk 6.17–26 and Green 260–68;
  • Lk 6.27–38 and Green 269–75;
  • Lk 6.39–49 and Green 275–81;

Please let me know by entering a comment below. Wednesday, I plan to talk about the position of the Pharisees, teachers of the law, feasting and fasting.

Temptation (Luke 4)

Commentators propose a number of explanations for the presence of the temptation scene in Luke 4. So François Bovon in his massive volumes, who sets it in the difficult, tense context of the pre-66 AD movements in Roman Palestine. As we know from Josephus, a well-informed and hostile witness, many of those movements were messianic and prophetic. It is difficult to distinguish between the two kinds of leadership. This is obvious when reading the gospels, which show evident unease, many years after the facts, when defining the respective roles of John the Baptist and Jesus. See Richard Horsley in numerous publications. The early followers of Jesus had to confront difficult political issues. We have echoes of them in texts from about 50 AD (Paul in his letter to the Galatians especially, as well as the hypothetical Q, and a proto-Mk?), from circa 80 AD (Mt and Lk), and 100 AD (John, Acts). Among these issues, a most fundamental one was display of fidelity, or faithfulness to a people, its institutions (the temple above all), its history (the Torah), its aspirations (to freedom, usually framed messianically). The early version of the story of the temptation was an answer to suspicions expressed regarding Jesus’ messiahship. The story in Q, with its three elements presumably arranged in the order we still have in Matthew, already dealt with the questions regarding the claims made by Jesus followers. It developed early on because it had become important and urgent to separate the understanding of Jesus’ messiahship from that which existed in Palestinian Jewish society.

One can give plausible explanations for why the Q story was kept by the Matthew and Luke gospels, whereas this tradition wouldn’t be interesting for the Mark community, supposing the author of the gospel of Mark had access to the tradition. One can also explain why the gospel of Luke transformed the story (re-arranging the order of the three temptations) in light of the concerns of a post-70 AD Judeo-Greco-Roman context in which political tensions had become even more exacerbated among the Jewish communities. The disaster of the 66–70 defeat was national, political, and religious. Messianic claims did not simply go underground, disguised in new apocalyptic colors, but they also became suspect. The intensity of the discussions is reflected in a passage among several from Josephus which describes the prophetic and messianic figures who arose in the period leading to the war. This well-connected priest had urgent survivalist’s reasons to please his imperial stoicizing, harmony-loving patrons after the Jewish revolt of 66–70. When he writes his account of the Jewish War, at about the time the gospels of Matthew and Luke were composed, he is quick to assume a take-no-prisoners approach:

Besides these there arose another body of villains, with purer hands but more impious intentions, who no less than the assassins ruined the peace of the city. Deceivers and impostors, under the pretence of divine inspiration fostering revolutionary changes, they persuaded the multitude to act like madmen, and led them out into the desert under the belief that God would there give them tokens of deliverance. [Jewish War 2.258–59]

The most suspect claim, from a Jewish community’s point of view in the post-70 period, one imagines, was that attached to Jesus. So, the defense of a messianic view of Jesus became even more concerned with the radical questioning Jewish communities couldn’t but direct at Jesus followers after the complete failure of all messianic movements.

All of this historical re-mapping, I admit, is fascinating but doesn’t get us one bit nearer the themes of the temptation story. It more or less satisfactorily explains its uses in the proximate context of later authors now called Matthew and Luke, or even its earlier context for its use in Q, but it remains a political, historicist analysis. It is story telling of a less inspired kind.

For a more appropriate literary view, better go to Amos Wilder or Gaston Bachelard, for instance the latter’s L’air et les songes. Essai sur l’imagination du mouvement (1943). Bachelard, in his third chapter on the imagined fall (“La chute imaginaire”), uses Edgar Poe to examine the knowledge of an ontological fall:

This sensibility, sharpened by the decrease of being, is entirely governed by material imagination. It needs a mutation that turns our being into a less earthly, more ethereal, more variable being, less close to drawn shapes.

= Cette sensibilité, affinée par la décroissance de l’être, est entièrement sous la dépendance de l’imagination matérielle. Elle a besoin d’une mutation qui fait de notre être un être moins terrestre, plus aérien, plus déformable, moins proche des formes dessinées. [Page 126]

Beginning with the spirit—like a dove a few verses before—, continuing with the movement in the desert, the in-a-blink lookover of all the kingdoms of the world, and ending at the top of the temple’s pinnacle and the proposed dream of an unending fall, everything flies in this story. The movement of the dreamy fall itself not only creates the abyss but reminds one of the verticality of things. Only saints know temptation and fall and verticality: isn’t that what defines them? As Caird says in his commentary on Luke, the person who goes to the gate of his garden when there is a bit of weather doesn’t know temptation as does the person who is travelling through the gale, and even more the person who climbs mountains. Speech itself in the story of temptation induces breath and the life-sustaining air to move in new ways.

So, for Edgar Poe who knew the state in which, in our dreams, we glide through the air and struggle with the spirit of the fall (ghost?) who wants us to sink, the power of speech is very near a material power, governed by material imagination.

= Aussi, pour Edgar Poe, qui a connu l’état où, dans nos rêves, nous planons dans l’air, où nous luttons contre l’esprit de chute qui veut nous faire sombrer, la puissance des paroles est bien près d’être une puissance matérielle, gouvernée par l’imagination matérielle. [L’air et les songes 126, his emphasis]

Luke 4

Here is a pdf of what I was talking about this morning in class. The readings for Monday are: Luke 5.11 to 6.11 and Green’s pages 227–257.

I mentioned the idea of asking you, the students, to take turns in briefly presenting a few pages of Green in relation to the Luke passage. I need five volunteers for this Monday to be responsible for one of the following passages:

  1. Green 230–35 and Lk 5.1–11;
  2. Green 235–38 and Lk 5.12–16;
  3. Green 238–43 and Lk 5.17–26;
  4. Green 243–50 and Lk 5.27–39;
  5. Green 250–57 and Lk 6.1–11.

My idea is to have everyone take turns to give their reading and understanding of Green and Luke (briefly, not a formal presentation). In regard to grading, it will be part of the participation in class, of course. Any volunteers for Monday? Please let me know by leaving a comment below.
— gildas

Luke 1–2

Here is the document I used this morning in class, but in a better format (PDF). At the end of it are the Josephus text from the Vita, as well as the song sung by Hannah in the story of Samuel’s birth at the beginning of the first book of Samuel, and texts from Exodus and Leviticus which help understand the background to the story of Jesus’ presentation at the Jerusalem temple. I will be adding my notes soon.

Books

  • Only one book is required for this LTPR 102 course on Luke, this Winter 2011:
    1. Joel B. Green. The Gospel of Luke (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W. B. Eerdmans, 1997), in the series: The New International Commentary on the New Testament (hardcover).
  • Since Green’s commentary includes the translation of Luke, there is no requirement to have a Bible. The following books are just recommended:
    1. The Bible, in the New Revised Standard Version (=NRSV). I recommend The New Oxford Annotated Bible with Apocrypha: New Revised Standard Version, College Edition (Hardcover), which costs ca. $25.00.
    2. Raymond Brown, An Introduction to the New Testament (The Anchor Yale Bible Reference Library) (Hardcover), which costs $38.00 or so new, but can also be found used.
  • I will supply a bibliography divided into standard commentaries and more specialized literature. Each student will use at least one of those commentaries (borrowed from libraries or on reserve) and be in charge of summarizing and presenting that particular point of view in class.

Epic and tragedy in the Bible

To my old question regarding the absence of the tragic form in the Hebrew Bible—I’m thinking of the mise à plat of the injustices and cruelties perpetrated in the Davidic royal house—, one answer is that the epic genre was abandoned by the Judean writers of the sixth and fifth centuries because its purpose was to sing heroes and kings (preferably winning ones). By the time the writer(s) of the books of Samuel and Kings were putting those books together as we have them, perhaps in competition with the authors of the books of Chronicles, where were the heroes and kings to be sung? Long gone. Add to this internal reason the fact and cruel reminder that the Assyrian, Babylonian, or Persian religious and political structures were most recognizable by their use of the epic genre, it was so necessary to them, as it had been to the little Israelite, Judaean and neighboring Aramaean kingdoms as long as they lived the life of kingdoms, that one of these, badly beaten (and repeatedly so), when it set about to recast its own stories about the world, couldn’t sing them, not without kings, without victories, without much of a pantheon.

The re-imagining and re-writing of Hebrew mythology implied a critical evaluation of divine forces and led to a giving up or relinquishing of the incantatory mode, at least in the recounting of human deeds. [Contra: as for the only king left in the new scheme of things, namely the dethroned divinity, think of Psalms, including the psalms of ascent especially, or Psalm 51 on David. In what way are they different?] This abandonment of the epic form in the telling of the origins of the world, did it not lead to—or: wasn’t it part of—a broader impossibility, namely the embellishment of the kind of human actions and stories found in classical tragedy? In contradistinction, see Aristotle’s commendation, regarding the need and appropriatedness of making things more beautiful, heroic, and more appealing than they could be or have been:

Since tragedy is a representation of men better than ourselves we must copy the good portrait-painters who, while rendering the distinctive form and making a likeness, yet paint people better than they are. It is the same with the poet. (Poetics 1448b.25 and especially 1454b.8–14, translation by Hamilton Fyfe, LCL)

Nobility, courage, cowardice, treason, pusillanimity, etc… were not the only driving forces for the author(s) of the book of Genesis or Kings, however, because they could not be.

Rise of monotheism

On Jan Assmann’s Of God and gods: Egypt, Israel, and the rise of monotheism (Madison: U. of Wisconsin Press, 2008). Assmann keeps talking about Moses as a symbolic, not historical character, which is fine, but I find more exact to speak of the story about Moses, of the authors of that story… About violence: Assmann tackles the passage about Phinehas in Numbers 25, and wants to show that one alluring aspect of polytheistic culture was the participation in feasting, i.e. sacrifices, to the gods of Moab (p. 116). But more than that was involved in the story of violence attributed to Phinehas. The background to the telling of the story is that the sharing of other gods in the ancient world was by the same token the sharing of women, the contracting with other families who had their own privileged access to gods and goddesses (clear for instance from their proximity to temples), and therefore the “sharing” of access to land and labor. Exilic Israel authors of the sixth and fifth c. BC, in this kind of stories, made virtue out of necessity, i.e., turned the impossibility of the conquest of lands and therefore the uselessness of adopting other gods, into a virtue or blessing, and finally a mark, as well defended as the normal conquest (by war, alliance, translation or translatability of gods). But this type of thinking, and reinforcement stories, could only follow other starker needs: to explain how and why their ethnic god still protected them and had a role to play.