Solomon: the lure of wisdom

Steven Weitzman’s book on Solomon (Solomon: the lure of wisdom, Yale University Press, 2011) is an elegant account of a famous biblical figure, the reasons for its appeal, and the risks that the pursuit of wisdom entails. I found it a frustrating read and here is why.

The author knows the exegetical and historical literature but proceeds to write as if 1 Kgs 2–11 is both story-telling and historical truth. God, Nathan, Ahijah of Shiloh and others meant or didn’t mean what they said or did. In the past tense. The author’s use of tenses is simple. The frequent use of the present tense suits a commentary and expansion on universalist or presentist aspects of a tale, but occasionally the past tense appears to suggest things did happen as the tale says, and the use of this past tense is rendered even more “historical” with a number of “perhaps, may…” Of course, this is nothing like Flaubert’s use of the imperfect and preterite in Un cœur simple (in Trois contes), where the first evokes not only the length, repetitiveness, and hardship of the character’s work and devotion (Félicité) but also the dynamics between fiction (Im-perfect, unrealized) and reality (that of XIXth c. servants). I wasn’t under any such enchantment, when reading The lure of wisdom. When there were moments of contemplation, I was quickly brought back to my ironic self by the strange insistence on historicity.

The book does discuss interesting ideas, such as the irreality of names like Shlomo, or the “unscriptability of human behavior…” (p. 14). One wants to retort to the author that, of course, the writer of this tale wants both to glorify a certain kind of kingship and show how dramatically tragic it can become for the simple reason that he is writing long after this king’s reign, in fact after the fall of the monarchy. And the writer doesn’t draw his tale in too subtle a way. Solomon is the son of a murderous, treacherous David. Born after proper marriage, however, not like the first baby which simply must disappear. It is the later writer’s dilemma which is of interest. How does he manage to glorify kingship yet explain its radical failure.

The book is retelling a good folktale but falters or is even deceptive when it keeps the reader guessing about the nature of the work: story telling of a sophisticated kind (both that of the original writer and Weitzman’s), or history, or both? If story, why not say, when talking about the Messiah for instance, p. 14, that “as this figure has yet to appear” is one take? And why drop little historical notes such as “no mean accomplishment in an age when many kings died prematurely,” about Solomon’s putative rule of forty years? Instead, shouldn’t one wonder about this perfect number and its meaning in biblical story-telling?

Page 18, the author speaks of the seduction (of the readers) by Freud and modern heirs such as Aviva Zornberg who purport to retrieve the “biblical unconscious.” What he himself is doing too, in launching into the description of historically framed sentiments, frustrations, etc…. He doesn’t wonder why the baby born of the adulterous and criminal relationship of David and Bathsheba dies, and why the one born after “proper” marriage survives…. Isn’t the end of the Israelite kingdom in this beginning, and aren’t we listening to a writer who knows better (long after whatever events there were)?

Regarding the story of David on his deathbed in 1 Kings 2 advising his heir Solomon (one of many possible heirs):

(page 21) Critical scholarship has concluded that this speech isn’t from David himself; it was written, or drastically rewritten, by an author living centuries after the king. [….] But other readers, accepting it as authentic, have detected within it certain intimations of that relationship, and theirs is a more productive approach to the text for our purposes.

Etc. Unbelievable. In fact, it is what the modern author assumes is the less productive critical view that is the more interesting, regarding the “author living centuries after the king.” And a large exegetical literature exists now that deserves more than a nod. Why write this way? The hopes and fears, as well as the interests, of the author of this speech, in the exilic or post-exilic period, that would surely be a “productive approach to the text.”

Then, very soon after this passage, as he is discussing the rabbinic exegesis of Solomon’s superior wisdom (superior to David’s), the author slips back into the critical mode: “Apart from the fact that such stories are completely made up…” (pp. 22–23).

The dream of 1 Kgs 3 is discussed, fairly extensively, pp. 23–30. It would present a rupture in the king’s life, a sudden irruption of a deeper form of wisdom… The author notes it is the only dream of Solomon that has been recorded (surprising turn of phrase!), when in fact it is the only dream of any Israelite or Judean king that has been invented, which should raise some questions. Of course it is not the only dream in the Bible. Other kings, typical of hated foreign rule, that is, the Pharaoh (Joseph story) and its eastern imperial counterpart the Babylonian king (Daniel) had dreams set in stories produced very late (Hellenistic period for Daniel, a little earlier for Joseph’s cycle?). Yet, these kings were so naïve and incompetent, in the view of the post-exilic writer, that they had to call upon their Yahweh-informed onirocritics to understand what they meant, how history really went…. Clearly, the biblical story-tellers, by which I mean the post-exilic biblical story-tellers, didn’t care much about their own kings having dreams, which in the ancient world was tantamount to laying claim to direct access to divine will. They were not willing to grant them that kind of access. The fact that of all the kings of Israel and Judah only Solomon had a dream revelation of Yahweh’s will should be cause to question the motivation of the story-teller, and whether we are not looking at a completely made up tale.

Weitzman has opted for a kind of enchantment that depends on extending the strength of the original tale. For enchantment he needs power: he needs to hold the reader in his grip and keep the magic going. Not only does he hope to derive some of that power metonymically from the massive artistic and literary interest in the Solomonic figure over the centuries—including the Song of Songs and all of its mystical and literary wake—but he also needs to anchor the magic in a historical reality, no matter its nature. This he attempts to do by writing as if Solomon existed and performed or thought the things described in 1 Kings. On top of that, he uses a special, shadowy theoretical modern language (Freudianism, literary theory, etc.) as substitute for a more critical inquiry. To me, that’s a magic trick, which is fine entertainment. Tall order, this magic vs reality thing. We are not amused.

Friends of the Children

is an organization which connects kindergarten children growing up in poverty with adult mentors for twelve years. This is not a volunteer program. The mentors are paid and it costs about $9,000 per child per year. The positive effects on children’s well-being, safety, education, as well as on their parents are stunning. This NYT article describes the program and how beneficial it is to all of society, even by hard-nosed economic calculations.

More geometrico

In 1677, shortly after Spinoza’s death, Nicolas Steno wrote an intelligence report on Spinoza’s philosophy for the Holy Office in Rome. He had come into the possession of a manuscript of Spinoza’s Ethics which he handed over to the Church’s Holy Office. This report, quoted below, is a fascinating witness to the kind of discussions on science and theology that raged in the seventeenth century. Nicolas Steno (Niels Stensen) was a brilliant pioneer in anatomy (brain and nerves), geology, palaeontology (how to explain the presence of sea fossils in high altitude deposits) and crystallography. He wrote pivotal scientific papers, then converted to Catholicism, became a priest and bishop who lived a short, pious, ascetic and generous life.

Steno had the opportunity to know Spinoza and his milieu in 1661–63.

This accusatory document was kept in a Vatican work called “Forbidden books concerning the new philosophy of Spinoza.” The text below comes from Leen Spruit and Pina Totaro, The Vatican manuscript of Spinoza’s Ethica (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 9–13. I take the liberty to quote their translation of Steno’s report in its entirety. The discovery of the manuscript of the Ethics, to whose existence I was alerted by JFH, is a very important event, and so is the book as it illuminates the evolution of Spinoza’s thought. Steno’s report follows (the impatient can jump down to the fourth paragraph for Steno’s summary of Spinoza’s philosophy):

The Holy Office has certainly been informed by other persons about the damage done by the new philosophy through a certain Spinoza in Holland; nonetheless, the seriousness of the evil and the peril of the propagation of this evil are so momentous that no effort in discovering it and in taking appropriate countermeasures can be exaggerated, in order to prevent further infections as far as possible and, if this is possible, to heal those already poisoned. This moves me to present the following report to the Holy Office.

About fifteen or sixteen years ago, when I studied at the University of Leiden in Holland, I had the occasion to become acquainted with the afore-mentioned Spinoza of Hebrew birth, but of profession without any religion, about whose doctrines I had only a confused understanding at the time. Once he had abandoned the rabbinical school of education, where he had studied for some time, he started, thanks to his acquaintance with a certain van Enden, suspected of atheism, and with the teachings of the philosophy of Descartes, to develop his own philosophy, in which he explained everything by matter only. And although in that period he paid me daily visits to see the anatomical investigations of the brain that I carried out on several animals in order to discover the place where motion begins and sensation ends, God nonetheless protected me so that he never explained to me any of his principles. In fact, God availed Himself of me to give him a chance to humble himself, first in the anatomy of the brain, showing him that neither my hand with the scalpel nor his mind with its scrutiny could arrive at establishing anything at all, but also with certain experiments concerning the heart and the muscles, where God showed me the true working of nature, thereby giving me the opportunity to overwhelm the lies proposed by those wits as true and to reprove their false presumption with the following argument: if they failed in issues as easy as these, what certainty will they be able to offer about not being deceived in difficult ones? God obviously aimed at diminishing the esteem that had arisen in me for them, so that I would not follow their errors as well as to prepare me for the grace of faith, which he was planning to grant me.

The afore-mentioned Spinoza afterwards published several books, some under his own name, others anonymously; one of these provided me with the occasion some years ago to compose a letter De vera Philosophia contra novae Philosophiae reformatorem, which I subsequently published. And although all his printed works display signs of his main intentions, he has mixed these up with views he did not share, thus avoiding the risk of being too plain, as he had been in some of the manuscripts that he composed. He possibly would have published the latter before his death, if some of his confidants had not warned him of the risk to which he exposed himself. I knew that this kind of manuscript existed, but I had never seen any of them, until some weeks ago when I happened here [in Rome] to discuss the subject of religion with a Lutheran foreigner, who after several conversations about the issue of religion brought me a manuscript without revealing its author, begging me however not to show it to others nor to inform them that he entertained similar views. And so I did at the time, not imagining the serious evil that I was to discover when reading the text, which I understood—and he confessed—to be by Spinoza. I always carry the manuscript with me, in order that nobody may by chance come into contact with the poison it contains. And so as to contribute, as much as I can, to the spreading of the glory of God, and to prevent major damage, I will here report on the main doctrines of this infidelity and on the manner in which further information may be gathered both about similar works and about the persons who adhere to them.

The basis of all their evil is a pretentious overestimation of their understanding and their desire of sensual joys.

They make of their own understanding the measure of all things, so that they may deny something simply because they cannot form a clear and distinct concept of it; in fact, they make of the human mind a part of the mind of God, and they don’t blush in saying what they know cannot be known more clearly by God than by them.

Concerning the joys of the senses they teach that true wisdom consists in enjoying the pleasures of each sense, and of theatres, smells, foods, etc., to the extent that they do not cause nuisance to themselves or damage to others; nor is there any need for thinking of penance or fear of God, or other ways to sadden the souls.

Thus, while their infelicity keeps them buried under the mud of the senses, without allowing them the time or force to raise their minds to the consideration of spiritual things, they wish, by means of mathematical demonstrations, to explain to everybody that in the universe there is only one substance, infinite and eternal, of which two attributes are known, which are equally infinite, namely infinite extension and infinite cogitation; and that all that occurs in the universe can be explained by one or the other of these attributes. They call motion a mode of extension, and thought a mode of cogitation, in such a way that to every motion corresponds an individual thought. This substance (they say) is God, of which every single body and every mind are parts. That is, if they consider God as extended, every body is part of Him; in fact, He is the collection of all bodies that have been, are, or will be in an infinite series. And as they consider him as cogitation, each thought is part of Him; in fact, he is the collection of all thought in an infinite series. They deny providence or freedom in God, but instead postulate an absolute necessity, without the intention of any end, just as in mathematics from the nature of the circle follow infinite properties without any intention of a given end, but simply as a necessary consequence. Thus, they do away with every virtue and vice, all justice of rewards and punishments, with the exception that one gives to certain persons absolute power, which everyone has with respect to the things he needs, in order to maintain everybody’s private security under public security. By consequence, there is no other sin than disobedience to the civil magistrate. It is therefore evident that all this philosophy is nothing else than the product of sense and of pride, in which vices of one’s own choice become necessity, which denies choice itself. They may well promise a reform of morals, but they go against their own principles as they propose two classes of man, one that possesses only confused knowledge and is driven by appetites, and the other that has adequate knowledge and is no slave of the appetites, but follows reason. They pretend that by providing mankind with adequate knowledge, they will transform men from slaves to free individuals, although they confess this is hard, and not for everybody—while in truth, it is for no one: For among many of those whom I have got to know, and not even in the head of these errors [sc. Spinoza], did I encounter a virtue similar to those that I found in many Catholic halfwits I met. On the contrary, less than three years ago when during my travels I paid a visit to one of them whom I had got to know many years earlier, I found him smoking a pipe surrounded by glasses of wine and beer. And presuming I shared his ideas, when he heard that I intended to prove the presence of God’s hand in the Catholic faith through the conversion of the depraved from one extreme to another, and sometimes instantaneously, as I had already happened to witness thanks to divine grace, he desired to claim that there existed no virtues more perfect than his own. And it was with great compassion that I saw a half-drunk boasting of being perfect in every virtue.

A method to gather more information would consist in this, that each time that one encounters someone interested in mathematics and Cartesian philosophy and has studied for a certain period in Holland or England, to seek his confidence and to seek information from him about the new views and about persons interested in new philosophical doctrines. Indeed, it seems morally impossible that such a person should not be informed about, or in fact already sharing in, a part or all of these errors. My reason for believing this is based upon the fact that the followers of this infidelity or apostasy place all their happiness in the enjoyment of every sense as well as in the delight of fantasy, and in order to obtain this enjoyment they seek to learn as many natural and mathematical truths as possible. For this reason, when they see persons who apply themselves to such studies, they readily approach them, both in order to learn something new and so as to see whether they can win them over, with the hope that their philosophy will reach perfection if more persons apply themselves to it. This secret of them I have discovered both thanks to the knowledge of their principles which I obtained from the examination of the afore-mentioned manuscript, and through my acquaintance with one of them, whom I wished to convert to the faith with the aid of divine grace, and who, before I discovered that he was one of them, changed his appearance several times, feigning now one creed and now another. But when he realized that someone had informed me about his views and that I opposed these merely with reasonable grounds for doubt, he eventually opened his mind entirely. [He explained that] they only rarely open their mind, because they find only very few men capable of applying themselves to it, and many, according to their view, who are too preoccupied by prejudice, who immediately detest them; to this he added his desire that I also apply myself entirely to natural philosophy, and expressed their hope that philosophy would reach a level of great perfection if more persons agreed among one another.

I fear that the evil has widely spread, and I know that the said Spinoza, while he was still alive, frequently received letters from England. Moreover, I know that a person from another country stayed several days in his house in order to better grasp it all. Finally, pondering upon remarks, when I was last in my country, made by a countryman of mine who had been in Holland, I now recognize the same principles that are also found in the manuscript. Thus, among heretics these views are widely spread, whereas I cannot remember even one Catholic who ever spoke to me about similar topics.

4 September 1677

Nicolò Stenone, the Dane, gave the Commissioner these two written pages.

Propaedeutics

The sun flecks on a table,
clouds in heavens,
and blue eyes left behind,
are waiting for words, silences to come.
The wind moves hair, leaves, voices,
quenches souls’ thirst
and dies inked on bible paper.

Moral rearmament

Short note on David Brooks’ editorial column of today’s *NYT* on the superficiality of empathy, which he is willing, the great expert that he is, to explain by the presence of mirror neurons in our brains. Diafoirus in Molière’s *Le malade imaginaire* didn’t know yet about these *neuronii specularii*. How convenient for Brooks that empathy doesn’t work too well, because it is apparently dropping, according to this U of Michigan study. That drop kind of shocked the moralist in Brooks, apparently, as he told us in his previous paper. He recovered in a couple days and saw a way he could cut his losses. Since empathy doesn’t really trigger behavioral changes, Brooks calls for a return to moral codes. The equivalent of abandoning leveraging and going back to old fashioned pay as you go. Here is his conclusion:
>The code isn’t just a set of rules. It’s a source of identity. It’s pursued with joy. It arouses the strongest emotions and attachments. Empathy is a sideshow. If you want to make the world a better place, help people debate, understand, reform, revere and enact their codes. Accept that codes conflict.

Ah, the joys of modern kantism without Kant. I am not too surprised to see Brooks defending codes (he mentions religious, military, social or philosophic codes), although I don’t understand how this call of his fits with the capitalism he systematically defends. Modern capitalism really doesn’t want any of those annoying, restrictive codes and positively needs to see them destroyed, though it keeps exploiting (for a while longer at least) the beliefs of those who still go by them.

There are people who have little choice but to live by very demanding moral codes. An example of the power of such codes can be found in an article in *Le Monde Diplomatique* of September 2011 which describes the shameless exploitation of women from the Philippines (among others) by rich households the world over. The article focusses on Hong Kong. The Filipino foreign domestic workers in Hong Kong are paid the equivalent of about 500 euros per month + whatever is necessary to have them doing the service on the spot (little room, etc.), work 6/7 days, shouldn’t count their hours of course (10, 12 a day?), must make their employers happy at all times, etc… Many of those workers live by very conservative codes, Christian often. Salt of the earth. No empathy on the part of their employers, or only of the fake kind, according to the article. Capitalism apparently needs to exploit them to the fullest, including their sense of moral values, but also needs them to be voracious consumers of goods, because the economic machinery must continue and grow.

What does Brooks recommend in their case? To stick to their moral codes?

How to delete zotero data

In case anyone wants to delete the bibliographic data stored on Zotero (the Zotero info doesn’t help at all, as far as I could tell), here is what I did. I had over 5,000 items on Zotero which I wanted to delete. The reason is that I much prefer Bibdesk because it is flexible, fast, convenient, and works well with Textmate, XeLaTeX, and/or TeXShop for processing and pdf production. I couldn’t find a “data delete” button on the Zotero web page. So, I launched the Zotero extension (“add-on”) in Firefox, highlighted all the references in the library with shift-click, dragged them to the trash (or used Delete, I’m not sure anymore), then clicked on Trash and repeated the operation. “Sync” wiped the data on Zotero. Took a little while. Then I removed the Zotero folder left on my machine (Mac: /Users/username/Library/Application Support/Firefox/Profiles/random string/zotero) and whatever preference zotero files I had in /Library/Preferences. As for my Zotero account on the website, I removed it indirectly by deleting the email account associated with it. Cumbersome, but it worked.

± violence?

I am curious about a new book on violence, by Steven Pinker, professor of psychology at Harvard: *The better angels of our nature: why violence has declined*. I look forward to reading it but couldn’t find it at our local book shop yet. Will it make the usual points about how much more violent hunter societies were before the Neolithic period? On this, see Guilaine in *Caïn, Abel, Ötzi*, pages 197–99, or Guilaine and Zammit, *The origins of war: violence in prehistory*. Note that a sort of containment of violence happens with the appearance of the professional warrior, sometimes in the Bronze Age (2d millenium), except in the city-states of Mesopotamia, where it happens a little earlier (i.e. 4th millenium BC).

It will be interesting to see the tables which the author gathered in support or illustration of this thesis. Can one really do the kind of research done by Muchembled on the Middle Ages (end) and the early modern period (much before Pinker) on other periods? It shows a clear decrease of all kinds of violent behavior. See Muchembled, *Une histoire de la violence: de la fin du Moyen Âge à nos jours*, which broadens the scope of his *thèse de doctorat d’état* on violence in Artois between 1400 and 1660, published in 1985.

It will be interesting also to see what is measured under this name “violence?” Is the violence of a patriarchal society going after its daily bread the same as the violence in a society in which there is a surplus of goods since at least the 18th c., though ill distributed, and in which the reason for violence is much less connected to this bread-earning need? And is it measured by the number of acts deemed violent today, in relation to the presumed demographics of yesteryear and the better known modern population numbers?

What are the reasons the author gives for this civilizational trend? In his talk on Ted.com—a sort of TV university—, Pinker speaks of four possibilities: the role of Hobbes’ Leviathan state in taming our ur-brutish instincts, the higher price put on life, the realization that life is a non-zero-sum game (cooperation profits parties, commerce and better understanding of the commonality of interests are good for everyone, peace dividend also. In other words: rational calculations), and the expanding circle of empathy (expanding beyond kinship systems for instance). I would like to be sure that what is to be explained is not assumed as pre-existing. The thesis seems partly to go along with the likes of Norbert Elias, perhaps Weber, and against a presumed modern sentiment, often hostile to religion, or against the picture drawn by Foucault. No need to scare ourselves silly with thrillers and big bad wolf stories. Even the nazi kind?

When listening to Pinker’s talk on Ted.com referred to above, I was curious about his remarks on violence in the Bible, which is a very common theme in modern conversations. If the general thesis is that violence has gone down thanks to a civilizing process à la Norbert Elias (who thinks court life had much influence, vs Muchembled who sees the influence of early urbanization), why does Pinker bother to refer to the frequent passages of the Bible which call for the extermination of the enemy, as in Numbers? Does he think the Biblical passages are actually reactionary because of the underlying monotheism, or is he just interested to show that they simply belong to their time (Assyrian cruelty is well documented too), no matter what theologians say about “ethical monotheism?”

Footnote on this discussion of violence and monotheism: see Jean Soler and others who follow a long tradition of laying much of the Western tradition of violence at the feet of monotheism. For instance Soler in *La violence monothéiste*; Assmann considers the question honestly but wants to save the baby (ethical monotheism): *The price of monotheism*; more generally on religion and violence, see Hans Kippenberg, “Aktuelle religiöse Gewalt aus Handlungstheoretischer Perspektive. Frobenius-Vorlesung 2002”; and Kippenberg and McNeil, *Violence as worship: religious wars in the age of globalization*.

Pinker’s talk on Ted.com made clear that he subscribes to a view of the “civilizing process” as non-Rousseauist (brutish origins) and accepts that technological progress and an ever fuller mastery over nature simply breeds too many interlocking interests which violent behavior cannot be allowed to threaten. So Hobbes mixed with Elias. I have to ask: what happens when the mediation of the state falls by the wayside?

Finally, I would like to see if the book by Pinker has anything to say about the effects of religious representations, so important surely in transforming the practices of war as well as justice since late antiquity. For instance, what of the effects of the beliefs concerning the body (other people’s body) manifested by the evolution of crucifixion scenes, and later on such etchings, drawings or paintings as those of Callot or Goya (both on war disasters, however)? Quoting from the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (online), but see Mâle, Dupront et al:
>By the 6th century, however, representations of the Crucifixion became numerous as a result of current church efforts to combat a heresy that Christ’s nature was not dual—human and divine—but simply divine and therefore invulnerable. These early Crucifixions were nevertheless triumphant images, showing Christ alive, with open eyes and no trace of suffering, victorious over death. In the 9th century, Byzantine art began to show a dead Christ, with closed eyes, reflecting current concern with the mystery of his death and the nature of the incarnation. This version was adopted in the West in the 13th century with an ever increasing emphasis on his suffering, in accordance with the mysticism of the period.

Were the paintings of the dead Christ by Mantegna (1490) and especially Holbein (1521–22) a manifestation of the expansion of empathy and compassion brought about by a better perception of the advantages of economic cooperation, or do they come from a longer tradition which actually brought about more cooperation? From a willingness to look at the body of a tortured man, far away in time and space, as somehow closely related to oneself, even ground for oneself? Chicken or egg question. In any case, the book by Pinker promises to be an interesting read.

memento mori

All local stations this morning, whether broadcasting BBC, NPR, or other programs, were in memory mode. I shut the radio off after a couple of minutes, for the same reason I shut off the television ten years ago when I realized I was looking at people jumping off the WTC buildings. Time enough to hear a line or two of the psalm Obama read and recognize Psalm 46. This is the psalm in which one of the translators or arrangers of the 1610 King James Version placed the words “shake” and “spear” respectively 46 words down from the beginning and 46 words from the end (not counting the concluding *sela*), presumably to honor Shakespeare’s 46th birthday in 1611. A mundane thing to do to a sacred text, yet not so different from what the Hebrew poet (or arranger) did in the same Psalm when making sure the words Elohim and Yahweh were used respectively 7 and 3 times. It is understandable the 1610 translator would be fascinated by such an artificial arrangement of three stanzas and a refrain that appears only after stanzas 2 and 3, and carry it a little further.

I don’t find this particular psalm very comforting or helpful. The reason for the impression is not simply that it uses a little rhetorical gadgetry. To say that: “The Lord of hosts is with us; the God of Jacob is our refuge” (NRSV translation) is a fine incantation. It may help those who suffer real losses. But the others? When the powers that be use this incantatory language, what is it for? I still remember Billy Graham a few days after the attack on the towers, in Washington’s cathedral, calling for moral rearmament, struggle against Satan, evil…. exactly the same discourse Mollah Omar was giving to the Pashtun population at about the same time.

There is hope. Perhaps Wall Street will stop selling and trading labor Monday. Perhaps radio and television stations will go real quiet.

Manet exhibit last July

July 01, 2011, I was lucky to see the Manet exhibit at the musée d’Orsay. I waited a long time outside, after a long walk along les quais de la Seine, while reading *Le Monde Diplomatique* on the architecture and social dynamics of the modern city. Mobile city where the powerful make the world move around themselves: RER trains for instance, or a fireman yesterday going far (2 hours +) to his appointment with top officers and administrators of the region for a boost to his retirement (not granted), versus the French president not wanting windows on his presidential plane or Paris looking like the museum of our being, our expensive tax-gobbling center for desultory luxury lovers à la *Midnight in Paris*.

A few notes on Manet. *Les courses à Longchamp*, 1866: I re-imagine or remember that the emerald trees or the images on the horizon explode in a gallop that engulfs me. The horses, whipped to the point of folly, scatter around the spectator. The world hurled at me. *Clair de lune sur le port de Boulogne*, 1869: a group of women waits for men in the night. The little orange spots sprinkled at half-frame (flames), the blinding whiteness in the harbor, it’s for them, it’s them. *La rue Mosnier aux drapeaux*, 1878: a one-legged man—war wound?—his back to the spectator, walks alone on the shady side of a long, flag-decorated street, a sort of canyon where the national, republican procession has aroused everyone. Light colors however, not an obvious political commentary.

Outside the exhibit: what Manet had begun to dare, Van Gogh completes. *L’arlésienne* of 1888, detached on yellow, not on a hole in the sky, sitting on a chair of matter, with her near-green face. *La méridienne*, its burning vault, the sickles properly put away behind, it is not Boaz and Ruth. Everything is burning in this painting. Must one have done the harvest oneself with sickle or scythe, and have read the book of Ruth, to feel it?

Dominionism

Two days ago, NPR broadcast an interview on an “apostolic” or “dominionist” movement that is seeking not simply to influence all spheres of human activity but infiltrate, conquer, and control them with the supposed goal of putting them back under complete divine guidance. The divinity has entrusted the world to humanity (see Genesis 1.28) but clearly must be helped, because it has been either too busy or remote to notice the entropy in the administration of terrestrial affairs (neglect?), or unable to counteract the power grab by Satan and his demonic underlings (so, a weak and improvident or even reckless divinity?). And now, time is pressing, the coming of the millenium is to be helped, even accelerated, there is a second coming of Christ around the corner, either at the beginning of the millenium of peace, or at its completion. Strange, contradictory theories that look like a composite of pieces from ancient gnosticism (the world a prison controlled by demonic powers) and Christian millenarism.

Modern politics, business, education, arts, media, even religion, are marked by a rationalism and especially a tolerance that Satan uses to its own ends, world conquest. Satan has taken over: abortion and gay rights, evolution… They must be taken back, even through violence or trickery, and be under divine dominion. As if this hadn’t been done by the Catholic Church for centuries. No matter: they were papists, also under Satan’s yoke. Thin excuse for the likes of Perry or Bachman, together with business-savvy church leaders, to bamboozle people all too happy to relinquish control of their affairs and not examine the more complex reasons for our economic and political problems.

Note that the moral issues raised by the Christian right cost little to public finances. Very convenient for politicians.

Gildas Hamel