NYT opinion piece on Iran today by Ryan Crocker, career ambassador to Lebanon (1990–93), Kuwait (1994–95), Syria (1998–2001), Pakistan (2004–7), Iraq (2007–9), and Afghanistan (2011–12), specialist of the Middle East (Persian and Arabic speaker), and presently dean of the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M. His argument regarding Iran: that the US should engage it directly. Why? Because there is solid, tested, evidence for the existence of a rational calculus on the part of the post-78 Iranian authorities. Iran has provided help regarding the situation in Afghanistan initially, presumably because of its own fears of Sunni Islam, especially the latter’s radical version. It has been willing to help even with certain aspects of Iraq.

How should the US behave towards Iran, according to Crocker? It should hold direct, confidential, multi-issue, non-ideological talks. What is in play? The lifting of sanctions, versus verification to the satisfaction of the “international community” (US + economically and militarily subject states) that Iran’s nuclear program will not be weaponized. His conclusion, after showing what is possible and should guide the negotiations: “the Iranians will have to move first. There can be no question of easing American sanctions until Iran has demonstrated its seriousness in confining any nuclear program to peaceful purposes.” In other words, we have the upper hand, their move.

But is it their move rather than ours? Why does Croker publish this kind of letter today if not because it has slowly dawned upon various Washington circles that the war we have been conducting economically, financially, and technologically against Iran has failed or is in danger of failing *and* leading to unintended, negative consequences for the US? This undeclared war has failed to bring compliance and is likely to continue to fail, given the new foreign policy and energy landscape. Because of this failure, and the tendency of Washington under Obama to hedge its support of democratic movements in the Levant, one aspect of the question is that the Saudis and emirates feel very nervous when considering the US energy landscape for the foreseeable future (short) and the potential strength of Iran in the region. If the US wants to continue to control the area in other ways than by purely military means, it needs to talk to Iran before the regional situation deteriorates further to the detriment of local reactionary US allies.

Interesting that a career ambassador, dean of the Bush School of Government at Texas A & M, is willing to print today that Bush’s “axis of evil” speech of early 2002 in effect killed any possibility of continued diplomatic work with Iran on essential security issues. To many of us from afar, even though we had access only to biased and government-fed newspaper articles (including the NYT), it was obvious that the march towards war with Iraq after 2001, increasing all along 2002, was crazy even from the most conservative, radical capitalist point of view. To attack and weaken the main enemy of Iran and risk changing the equilibrium of forces between Iraq and Iran, no matter the claims of democratic expansion, seemed contradictory and very dangerous, let alone immoral in the number of victims the actual war made. I remember intelligence specialists at the time (2002) recommending not to do it. Crocker seemed to think along those lines too (Burns-Crocker memo to Colin Powell, late 2002?). I wonder what the other US government officials were really thinking at the time, given the nauseating but comprehensible logistical and supportive role in Saddam Hussein’s favor towards the end of the Iraq-Iran war (1988) when Iran was in danger of running over Iraqi defenses. Myths and stories, says Rumsfeld? At the time, were Rumsfeld and coterie of friends ready to contemplate not only the weakening of Iraq but that of Iran, if need be, by surrounding this country physically (Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, Persian Gulf, emirates and Saudi Arabia) and strangling it in all possible ways?

A different attitude to Iran and other countries in the region at that time would mean a different outcome now in Syria. I should be glad, I suppose, that Crocker and others are having second thoughts, even if it is still at the service of a certain idea of a US-enforced ideological and economic order.